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Abstract 
This paper builds on the recent increased interest in interpersonal relations and evaluative 
judgements, especially in relation to intercultural interaction. It explores three key questions: (1) 
what or who is evaluated; (2) what warrants underpin the evaluations; and (3) the role of culture, if 
any, in the evaluation process.  It draws on work on norms and the moral order/moral foundations 
in pragmatics, moral psychology and cross-cultural psychology to help identify the key issues of 
debate. It then analyses some authentic intercultural business interaction data, along with follow-
up comments from the participants, to gain insights into these questions.  The paper ends with a 
suggested flow diagram of the evaluation process in intercultural interaction and recommends 
further research to explore several elements of the process.  
Key words 
Norms; culture; moral order; evaluation process; interpersonal relations; (im)politeness.  
Highlights 
• When norms are violated, both behaviour and agents are evaluated; 
• The performance/breach of norms can have different ‘meanings’ to different people;  
• Norms and the moral order should be conceptually separated; 
• Valuable insights can be gained from moral psychology and cross-cultural psychology; 
• Culture can affect awareness of others’ norms and moral foundations priorities.  
 
1. Introduction 
Many years ago, Fraser and Nolan (1981, p. 96) argued that words and phrases are not inherently 
polite or impolite, but rather are judged as such by participants. Yet, as Kádár and Haugh (2013, p. 
60) point out, for many years there was remarkably little research into the process of interpersonal 
evaluation. Recently this has begun to change, with a number of papers (e.g. Chang & Haugh, 2011; 
Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2016; Fukushima, 2013; Haugh & Chang, 2018; Kádár & Márquez-Reiter, 
2015) reporting empirical studies of people’s evaluative judgements. In the last few years there 
have also been a number of publications (e.g. Culpeper, 2011; Davies, 2018; Haugh, 2013b; 
Spencer-Oatey & Kádár, 2016) that have aimed at theorising the evaluation process. Nevertheless, 
Davies (2018, p. 122) maintains that “the enthusiasm for the concept of evaluation in discursive 
approaches to (im)politeness has overtaken the degree to which it has been theorized,” suggesting 
that there is still more work to be done. This article addresses this need. It builds on the conceptual 
work done so far and extends it by incorporating additional insights from moral psychology and by 
exploring how they apply to intercultural interaction.  After an initial discussion of key conceptual 
issues associated with the evaluation process, it analyses some authentic intercultural interaction 
data that offer some valuable new insights.  The conceptual issues are then re-evaluated in the 
light of the findings and a flow-chart of the evaluation process is suggested.  
2. Key conceptual issues 
There are several conceptual issues associated with (im)politeness/relational 
evaluations that are currently being debated and three key ones are reviewed here: the 
elements and sequence of the evaluation process, the warrants underpinning the 
judgements, and the (potential) impact of cultural factors.  
2.1 The elements and sequence of the evaluation process 
Eelen (2001, p. 109) argues that “the very essence of (im)politeness lies in the evaluative moment.” 
This raises a fundamental question: what, or who is being evaluated? Eelen does not discuss this, 
but from his comments the implication is that it is the behaviour that is being evaluated, as he only 
refers to this; for example:  
In everyday practice (im)politeness occurs not so much when the speaker produces 
behaviour but rather when the hearer evaluates that behaviour. (p.109) 
As it [an evaluation-centred model] no longer assumes that a specific behaviour will 
automatically trigger a specific hearer evaluation, it has to wait for a hearer evaluation to 
occur in reality before it can examine its link with the preceding speaker behaviour. … a 
non-predictive evaluation-centred perspective permits the researcher to actually question 
the link between behaviour and evaluation. (p.111)  
Haugh (2013a, p. 53) likewise focuses on ‘interactional practices’, arguing that we need to pay 
careful attention to these if we are to explore the grounds or warrants of (im)politeness 
evaluations. The same is true of Kádár and Márquez-Reiter (2015) who, in their exploration of 
bystander interventions, understandably focus on the evaluations of the wrongdoers’ actions. 
Nevertheless, their data show not only bystander evaluations of the behaviour but also evaluative 
comments of the wrongdoers themselves. For instance, in their Example 3 (p.251), the intervenor 
not only says “You do not push a woman out in public”, but also “You are just a little punk-ass kid”.  
This distinction between evaluation of behaviour and evaluation of the performer of that behaviour 
is one that Davies (2018) develops very explicitly. She proposes that there are three different 
elements or ‘levels’ (as she calls them) to evaluations: classifications of (im)politeness, assessments 
of persons, and argumentivity or rationales underlying these judgements. This is similar to the 
three aspects of moral judgement specified by the psychologists, Malle, Giuglielmo, and Monroe 
(2014) in their theory of blame. They refer to evaluation of events, evaluation of agents, and the 
appeal to norms. In terms of evaluation of events, they suggest people hold seriousness thresholds. 
These could presumably be subject to cultural and/or individual variation, although they do not 
discuss this. 
Perhaps because of their interest in the notion of blame, their conceptualisation of the evaluation 
of agents is particularly detailed, including distinguishing between agent causality, agent 
intentionality, agent obligation and agent capacity. They suggest the following flow of evaluative 
reasoning:  
• did the agent cause the event? 
o if no → no blame 
• If yes, did the agent cause the event deliberately? 
o If yes, what were the reasons? 
• If no, was the agent obligated to prevent the event? (i.e. should they have prevented it?) 
o If no → low/no blame 
• If yes, could the agent have prevented the event? (i.e. did the agent have the capacity to 
do so?) 
o If no  → low/no blame 
o If yes → agent blamed 
Building on this further, Voiklis and Malle (2018) propose another interpretive flow, this time 
providing a little more detail around the evaluation of the event and also incorporating the notion 
of a warrant that underpins or justifies the evaluations.  Figure 1 below combines their two related 
flow diagrams into a single representation. 
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Fig.1: Flow diagram of the evaluation process, derived from Malle et al. (2014) and Voiklis and 
Malle (2018) 
As can be seen from Figure 1, Malle and his colleagues incorporate intentionality in relation to the 
agent and the attribution of blame. Within pragmatics, the notion of intentionality is a highly 
contested issue, especially when interpreted as an a priori state (e.g. see Haugh, 2008 for a 
discussion). Within politeness theory, as Culpeper (e.g. Culpeper, 2011; Culpeper & Hardaker, 
2017) points out, it is often incorporated into definitions of impoliteness; for instance, Culpeper 
and Hardaker (2017, p. 203) include it in their definition of impoliteness (their emphasis): 
Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face-attack intentionally, or 
(2) the hearer perceives behaviour as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) 
and (2). 
Haugh (2008, p. 101) suggests that it is more usefully seen as a post facto attribution, used to 
account for norm violations; in other words, as an element of the evaluation process.  He also 
points out that “full intentionality is not a necessary condition of impoliteness” and this can be 
because the agent is unaware of the impoliteness effects they have caused and “for not predicting 
those effects”. The multiple steps of the evaluation process illustrated in Figure 1 offer further 
explanation and support for this position. On the one hand, evaluations are made of events as well 
as agents, and intentionality only applies to agents not to events; on the other, as Malle et al. 
(2014) argue, even when the agent has no intention to offend, if s/he does not prevent the offence, 
when both obliged and capable of doing so, then some blame may still be attributed to the agent.  
The literature thus suggests that when an unexpected event occurs, evaluations are made of both 
that event and the agent(s) associated with it. This leads us to the next question: what criteria or 
underlying warrants do people use in making those evaluations? 
2.2 Evaluations and the underpinning warrant 
The underpinning rationale or warrant for people’s evaluative judgements is widely known as the 
moral order (e.g. Haugh, 2013a, 2013b; Kádár & Haugh, 2013; Spencer-Oatey & Kádár, 2016). 
Garfinkel (1964, p. 225) explains this as follows:  
A society's members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of 
action-familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with 
others and with others taken for granted. […] For members not only are matters so about 
familiar scenes, but they are so because it is morally right or wrong that they are so. 
Garfinkel’s explication seems to treat norms and the moral order as almost synonymous, and a 
similar stance has been taken by Haugh (2013a, 2013b) and Kádár and Haugh (2013). For instance, 
Haugh (2013a, p. 57) links the expectations that constitute the moral order with the norms that 
“somehow afford or constrain the behaviour of members”. In other words, these various theorists 
seem to be arguing that the moral order refers to the norms that members of a sociocultural group 
hold.  
Eelen (2001) does not use the term moral order, but links evaluations with appropriateness, 
expectations and social norms. He argues that social appropriateness is closely linked with hearer 
expectations, and that hearer expectations are based on norms. He further explains that “the 
norms that govern appropriateness are social norms. They are not individual norms held only by 
the hearer, but rather pertain to situations and cultures” (p.128). Yet he also says (p.37) that 
evaluations are intimately connected with social values.  
All this paints a rather confusing picture and one that is replicated to a certain extent within 
psychology. Cialdini (2012) distinguishes between two types of norms: ‘descriptive norms’ and 
‘injunctive norms’. He explains the difference as follows:  
In contrast to descriptive norms, which specify what is done, injunctive norms specify 
what ought to be done. They constitute the moral rules of the group … whereas 
descriptive norms inform behaviour, injunctive norms enjoin it. (Cialdini, 2012, p. 297) 
Yet as both Spencer-Oatey (2008) and Culpeper (2011) point out, a descriptive norm can gradually 
become an injunctive norm, in that when something happens frequently enough, people can start 
to believe that it ‘ought to’ happen.   
This raises another question that has been debated for many years within psychology: is there a 
distinction between social norms and moral norms? Traditionally, theorists from both disciplines 
(e.g. Huebner, Lee, & Hauser, 2010; Kádár & Márquez-Reiter, 2015; Turiel, 1983) have regarded 
them as different. The basic idea is that some norms seem to be just a matter of convention – they 
are local and simply facilitate social interaction through a shared understanding of group etiquette. 
There does not seem to be a strong moral underpinning to them. These are known as social norms. 
In contrast, moral norms seem to proscribe behaviour that is more wrong and more punishable, 
with the wrongness being more authority independent. So, for example, if a child fails to raise his 
or her hand in class (when that is what the teacher requires them to do), most adults would 
interpret this as less ‘bad’ than someone physically hitting another child so hard that the latter is 
injured. Hand raising would be regarded as a social norm or social convention while avoiding 
physical or emotional harm to others would be regarded as a moral norm. Presumably breaches of 
both kinds of norms can affect interpersonal relations. 
The psychologist, Elliot Turiel (1983), many years ago proposed a set of four features that clearly 
distinguish moral transgressions from social transgressions. He argued that moral transgressions 
are (a) more wrong, (b) more punishable, (c) independent of authority structures, and (d) 
universally applicable. Since then, there have been numerous studies in psychology to test his 
claims, such as those by Huebner et al. (2010). Huebner and his colleagues have carried out many 
studies on the distinction between social and moral norms, using scenarios such as the following: 
One night Michael goes to a fancy restaurant. He orders a T-bone steak and when it arrives 
he picks it up and eats it with his hands rather than using his silverware. 
One night Joshua goes to a fancy restaurant and orders at T-bone steak. When it arrives he 
throws it as hard as he can into the face of a man sitting nearby. 
(Huebner et al., 2010, p. 6) 
Almost everyone would agree that the second scenario entails a moral transgression, but what 
about the first? It does not seem to be a moral transgression, but rather a social one. Some people 
may notice it as unusual but may simply dismiss it as actually practical and sensible. Others may 
evaluate the event as ‘inappropriate’ and may judge Michael to be ill-mannered. Perhaps such 
differences in reaction reflect disparities in people’s violation thresholds (see Figure 1). However, 
for those who form negative evaluations, whether of the first or the second, what would their 
rationales be? 
Davies (2018, p. 146) maintains that it is not always possible to attribute a moral rationale to an 
evaluation. In analysing some media comments on an incident in which a defendant made a rude 
gesture to a judge, she reports that the following comment had to be left uncategorized in terms of 
its rationale: 
(28)  Mike, USA 
 You must respect those judges.  
However, Spencer-Oatey and Kádár (2016) suggest insights can be gained from moral foundations 
theory (MFT) proposed by Jonathan Haidt (e.g. Graham et al., 2018; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & 
Kesebir, 2010). Haidt and his colleagues have identified five moral foundations, as shown in Table 
1. Using MFT to consider Davies’ example, it is clear that Mike is appealing to the authority/respect 
moral foundation – that this value underpins his judgement of the defendant’s ‘rude’ behaviour. 
  
Table 1: The moral foundations of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) 
(Graham et al., 2018; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 822)1 
 
In terms of Huebner et al.’s (2010) scenarios, the MFT framework offers some clear insights into 
the second one: it is a violation of the moral foundation of care. But what about the first one? 
None of Haidt’s moral foundations seem to apply clearly and in fact it does not seem to be a moral 
transgression, but rather a social one. Some might argue that a few of Haidt’s foundations could be 
plausible. For instance, the onlooker might feel it was a betrayal of in-group standards of behaviour 
(loyalty/betrayal moral foundation); or the onlooker might regard it as subversion of traditional 
standards put in place by our seniors (authority/subversion moral foundation); or perhaps the 
onlooker might regard it as unhygienic (purity/degradation moral foundation). These all seem to be 
possibilities, and perhaps different people might appeal to different moral foundations, according 
to the relative strengths of their different cultural values. However, without further evidence, such 
links remain speculative. 
In one of their latest publications, Graham et al. (2018, p. 213) state that “there likely are many 
other moral foundations,”  but they offer no rationale for what should or should not be included as 
additional moral values. In contrast, Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2018) in their model of moral 
motives (MMM) propose such a rationale by linking approach/avoidance processes 
(prescription/proscription) with levels of analysis (intrapersonal/interpersonal/group). This yields a 
6-cell matrix, as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Mapping the moral foundations of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) against the Model of 
Moral Motives (MMM)  
 Self 
(Intrapersonal) 
Other 
(Interpersonal) 
Group 
(Collective) 
 MMM MFT MMM MFT MMM MFT 
Protect  
(Proscriptive 
regulation) 
Moderation  Not 
harming 
 
 
 
 
Care/ 
harm 
 Social 
order 
• Ingroup loyalty/   
betrayal 
• Authority/ 
subversion 
• Purity/ 
degradation 
 
Provide  
(Prescriptive 
regulations) 
Industrious-
ness 
 Helping/ 
Fairness 
Fairness/ 
cheating 
Social 
justice 
 
Moral Foundation Explanation 
Care/harm Concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and 
compassion. 
Fairness/cheating Concerns about unfair treatment, cheating, and more abstract notions of 
justice and rights. 
Loyalty/betrayal Concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, 
self-sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal. 
Authority/subversion Concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical 
relationships, such as obedience, respect, and the fulfillment of role-
based duties. 
Purity/degradation Concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of 
chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires. 
 Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2018) point out that the five foundations of MFT fall into only 3 of the 
cells of their MMM model (see Table 2, MFT items or gaps highlighted). They argue that two 
(care/harm and fairness/cheating) fall within the interpersonal level, with harm/care straddling the 
proscriptive/prescriptive distinction), while the remaining three (ingroup loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, purity/degradation) function primarily as mechanisms of social order and so 
fall within the proscriptive cell of the group level. They point out that MFT does not identify any 
moral foundations at the intrapersonal level (moderation, industriousness) nor does it include 
social justice at the collective level. 
Moral foundations are thus deep level values that underpin judgements of a wide range of norms 
and breaches of norms. More research is needed in order to assess the relative strengths of MFT and 
MMM for providing insights into the rationales underpinning evaluations of normative breaches, and 
the data discussed below provides an opportunity to do this. 
Returning to the question as to whether all breaches of norms are moral breaches, there are still 
significant differences of opinion within moral psychology (e.g. Knobe, 2018; Stich, 2018). 
Nevertheless, Huebner et al. (2010) conclude from their empirical studies that adults readily 
distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions for a wide variety of situations, but that 
there is probably a continuum that stretches from mere matters of personal preference to serious 
moral violations, rather than a clear-cut distinction. This suggests that while breaches of all types of 
norms may affect interpersonal relations, some (i.e. those closer to the moral end) may affect our 
judgements of other people more fundamentally and substantially than others, and hence have a 
more profound influence on interpersonal relations. This leads us to the third question: what is the 
role (if any) of culture in the evaluation process?  
2.3 The role of culture 
Kecskes (2014) points out that common ground between interlocutors is needed for effective 
communication and so the extent to which people share social and moral norms will affect (inter 
alia) the evaluative judgements they make.  
Kecskes (2014, p. 19) suggests that in intercultural interaction, as compared with intracultural 
interaction, there is sometimes a greater reliance on prior context than on actual situational context. 
So what kind of ‘mental content’ or ‘prior context’ can be regarded as ‘cultural’? Traditionally in 
psychology the focus has been on values (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz et 
al., 2012), but recent research (e.g. Fischer & Schwartz, 2011) has demonstrated that there is as 
much, if not greater, variation within national groups than across national groups in the values that 
people hold. There has simultaneously been an increased interest in the interconnections between 
culture and norms, with many papers being devoted to the topic in special issues, such as Morris, 
Hong, Chiu, and Liu (2015) in a special issue entitled ‘Social norms and cultural dynamics’ and Zou 
and Leung (2015), guest editors of a special issue entitled ‘Intersubjective norms’. Research is also 
emerging (e.g. Stanley & Fischer, forthcoming) on the impact of values such as tightness–looseness 
(e.g. Gelfand et al., 2011) and monumentalism–flexibility (e.g. Minkov et al., 2018) on the 
interconnections between norms and behaviour.  
All of this psychological research supports the concerns raised by Eelen (2001) regarding variability 
and lack of sharedness, which seem to undermine the argument for the impact of culture. These are 
complex issues with no easy resolution. However, it is important to separate two elements that are 
often conflated: the notion of cultural groups (the people among whom regularities are supposed to 
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be shared), and the extent to which group members truly share those practices and perspectives (for 
further discussion, see Spencer-Oatey & Žegarac, 2018). With regard to the first, in the intercultural 
field, cultural groups were traditionally treated as almost synonymous with national groups, but 
more recently there has been much greater recognition that cultural patternings exist in many other 
types of groupings which can range considerably in size. In fact, within linguistics/pragmatics, 
Holmes, Marra, and Vine (2011) and Kádár and Haugh (2013) refer to the nested nature of such 
groupings, with smaller groups such as teams or departments belonging to larger groups such as 
companies or universities. Regarding the second question, it is also now widely accepted that 
everyone belongs simultaneously to multiple cultural groups, so as Chao and Moon (2005, p. 1128) 
point out, “An individual’s unique collage of multiple cultural identities yields a complex picture of 
the cultural influences on that person”. They refer to this as a cultural mosaic, with people’s cultural 
identities comprising numerous ‘cultural tiles’.  The impact of those ‘tiles’ will vary for each 
individual, with the ‘tiles’ exerting different degrees of influence in different contexts in dynamic and 
complex ways during the co-construction of interactions. The fewer the ‘cultural tiles’ that people 
share, the more challenging communication is. 
In the following sections, we analyse two authentic examples of intercultural interaction to explore 
the three issues raised in this section: who and/or what is evaluated; what warrants underpin those 
evaluations; and what role, if any, culture plays. 
3. Data and methodology 
The extracts analysed in the next section come from data previously collected by the authors as part 
of a study of rapport management in Chinese–British business interactions. The interactions took 
place in the UK at the headquarters of a British engineering company that designs, manufactures 
and sells an engineering product throughout the world. In every contract signed in China, the 
company agrees to host a delegation of up to six people who are involved in some way in the deal. 
The official purpose of the visit is to inspect the products purchased, receive some technical training, 
and to have a good time sightseeing. The visits normally last about 10 days.  
Three types of data were collected for analysis throughout three delegation visits: (1) video 
recordings of all the official meetings; (2) field notes of supplementary aspects of the visit; and (3) 
interview and playback comments made by the participants. The British and Chinese participants 
were interviewed separately. In all aspects of the data collection, we endeavoured to maximise the 
validity and reliability of the data. In the months prior to starting the project, we developed very 
good relations with staff at the host company, and one of us spent as much time as possible socially 
with the Chinese visitors in order to build a good rapport with them (e.g. accompanying them on 
sightseeing trips). We were very satisfied with the ways in which everyone seemed to ‘conduct their 
business as normal’ and with their cooperation during the follow-up sessions, although we 
acknowledge that our presence may still have affected the proceedings to a certain extent.  
Previous analyses of the data (e.g. Spencer-Oatey & Xing, 2003, 2004, 2008) focused on face and 
rapport. For the purposes of this paper, the source data have been re-analysed from the perspective 
of evaluation processes, exploring the following research questions: 
RQ1: What elements are associated with the evaluation process? 
RQ2: What warrants underpin people’s evaluations? 
RQ3: How do cultural factors affect people’s evaluations? 
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The welcome meeting from one of the visits has been selected for detailed analysis, as it is 
particularly rich in evaluation issues. This meeting was attended by 6 Chinese visitors (all male) and 6 
British staff (5 male and 1 female). There was also an interpreter (male) present – a Chinese national 
studying for a PhD in engineering at the local university – who attended all the meetings. He was not 
trained as an interpreter and was recruited by the host company because of his technical 
engineering knowledge.  
4. Analysis 
The welcome meeting analysed was highly problematic in relational terms, despite the company’s 
experience over many years of handling such visits. The six Chinese guests were so annoyed with it 
that they cancelled all the training sessions that had been arranged, requested changes to the 
planned social programme, and asked to move to a hotel in London (far away from the company). 
Needless to say, neither party was pleased and after the delegation had left, the British staff made 
the following summative evaluative comments: 
Extract 1: Interview/playback comments 
Project engineer:  off the record, they haven’t any ethics, you know they had no due 
respect for their hosts, it was all sort of like we are more important 
than anything else. if I went to someone’s house, to travel, I 
wouldn’t say no I’m not interested in your product and I just want 
to go out and do things that I like 
Project administrator:  their interests were totally different. … they just wanted to shop. 
Proposals engineer: they thought they were important, they simply had no interest in 
our product which they bought, they demand this and demand that 
Here we can see that the British staff negatively evaluated the delegates’ behaviour (their requests 
for different things and their lack of interest in the products they were supposed to be inspecting 
and learning about). This led to a negative evaluation of the visitors, with them judged to be 
‘demanding’ and to have ‘no ethics’.   
In terms of the warrant underpinning their evaluations, there seem to be two key elements: (a) that 
this is unexpected behaviour when you are a guest somewhere, and (b) that it breaches the 
contractual/professional expectation to show interest in the product that one’s company has 
purchased. Digging a little deeper and thinking in terms of moral foundations, the former seems to 
appeal closest to the MFT foundation of care/harm – that the visitors were self-centred and only 
interested in themselves and did not show the mutual consideration that ‘good visitors should 
display’. In other words, in the eyes of the British staff, they breached the norms associated with 
‘good guest behaviour’ by being self-centred and hence did not uphold the moral foundation of care. 
The warrant underlying their lack of interest in the product does not seem to map onto any of the 
MFT foundations but could link with the MMM intrapersonal level (see Table 2). Their lack of 
interest in the product that their company had purchased could be seen as a lack of industriousness 
and their excessive focus on shopping suggests a lack of moderation.   
There is no indication that there are any cultural factors associated with these breaches of 
expectations. However, let us now examine some of the interactions that helped give rise to these 
summative evaluations. 
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Hosting incident 1: Seating arrangements 
The welcome meeting took place in the host company’s conference room. This room was rather small 
in size and had a large oblong table placed in the middle of the room. There were four chairs on either 
side, and a fifth at one end of the table. Four Chinese visitors sat on one side and two sat on the other 
side with the interpreter. One seat was left empty. The British chair of the meeting sat at the end of 
the table, and the five other British staff, who were present for the first part of the meeting, were 
located away from the table, with most either standing or sitting behind the Chinese visitors. The room 
arrangements made it physically difficult for people to move around to shake hands and to present 
business cards. 
Both the British and Chinese participants felt that the venue for the meeting was inappropriate. 
Afterwards, the British chair commented as follows: 
Extract 2: British chair interview/playback comment 
Chair:  When I came in what surprised me was obviously the number of people in the 
room … it was quite clear that we were in a little bit of a disorganised state. there 
were not enough seats for people, it was genuine chaos.  it was just in the wrong 
venue for the number of people there … the support staff were pressed up against 
the wall … there were quite limited options of how they could sit in this room. that 
didn’t really bother me, and to sit at the head of the table didn’t bother me as 
usually it’s the best way to address a group anyway, because at least you could see 
everybody, you should speak to them face to face, um, so that wasn’t too bad, that 
was OK. 
We can see from this that although the British chair felt things were disorganised and chaotic, he was 
not fundamentally disturbed by it. There was a shortage of seats, so he made sure that the visitors 
were seated at the table, thus prioritising their status as visitors, while several of the British staff had 
to stand. He clearly felt that it was OK for him to sit at the head of the table, as this would enable him 
to see all the visitors and could make eye contact with them when welcoming them and later when 
giving them an introductory talk about the company. In other words, he focused on the 
communication practicalities of the situation, while also allocating them the ‘best seats’ (i.e. seats at 
the table, not places behind these seats) – perhaps reflecting the underlying MFT moral foundation of 
‘care’. For him, the event was not problematic in relational (im/politeness) terms. 
In stark contrast to this, the Chinese visitors, and especially the head of delegation (HoD), attributed 
great significance to the seating arrangements, as can be seen from Extract 3. 
Extract 3: Chinese delegation interview/playback comments 
HoD: 中 in terms of the seating arrangements, it shouldn’t have been that he was the chair 
and we were seated along the sides of the table. with equal status, they should sit along 
this side and we should sit along that side, shouldn’t we. that’s the right way. you see 
in this situation they were chairing and we were audience, which naturally means you 
do what you are told 中 
[Other delegates chorus: 中 right right中] 
HoD: 中 they were, right from the start, they were commanding, in control, contemptuous. 
in actual fact we should have been given equal status中 
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Xu: 中 if such an occasion had taken place in China, the hosts and the guests would be 
seated along the two sides of the table中 
HoD: 中 yes the hosts and the guests should be seated along the two sides of the table. when 
they go to our factory to negotiate business, we always do that, they are seated along 
that side and we along this side. generally the heads are seated in the middle, the junior 
staff at the ends中 
As can be seen, for the Chinese delegates, and especially for the HoD, the arrangements were highly 
problematic. The visitors held clear injunctive norms as to how they should have been seated and 
because these were breached, the HoD attributed a range of negative qualities to the British hosts 
(commanding, controlling, contemptuous). The rationale underpinning his evaluations related to the 
MFT moral foundation ‘authority/subversion’. He claimed that the British had subverted relations by 
treating them as inferiors rather than equals.  
So from an evaluation perspective, both the British hosts and the Chinese delegates evaluated the 
behaviour (i.e. the seating arrangements) negatively. However, for the British this was merely poor 
planning/ arrangements, with no associated (im)politeness/relational implications. For the Chinese 
visitors, on the other hand, the situation was very different. They held clear injunctive norms as to 
how the seating should be arranged, and these were linked explicitly with relative hierarchy: equality 
for negotiating partners (sitting on opposite sides of the table) and status or rank for the members 
within each party (with the senior staff in the middle and more junior staff towards the ends of the 
table).  When these norms were breached, the Chinese visitors assumed that this was deliberate (i.e. 
that it was intentional) and hence were extremely offended.   
Neither the British chair nor the Chinese delegates were aware of each other’s differing norms and 
simply evaluated the arrangements without realising, or even suspecting, that the other party’s 
interpretations might be different. They were each drawing on their own cultural norms for handling 
(cross-national) business meetings. For the British chair, his norms were associated on the one hand 
with consideration and care (give the guests the best seats) and on the other with practical matters 
(being able to see the visitors clearly and communicate easily with them). For the Chinese visitors, 
however, their norms for seating arrangements were closely associated with the MFT foundation of 
authority/subversion.  
Hosting incident 2: A return speech 
Once the meeting got started, the British chair gave a very brief welcome speech and then asked 
each of the British staff to introduce themselves. They each did that briefly, giving their name, their 
job title, and what they are responsible for. After this, the chair asked the visitors to each introduce 
themselves (Extract 4, lines 1-2). The HoD turned to the other delegates commenting that they are 
each to introduce themselves (line 5) and one responded saying he should do it on their behalf (line 
6). The HoD then started to give a brief return speech (line 7), but was immediately interrupted by 
the interpreter, telling him not to do that but simply to introduce himself, giving him the exact words 
to say (line 9). The HoD seemed disconcerted by this and just repeated what the interpreter had 
suggested. Two other delegates (lines 13 and 16) then offered other pieces of information he should 
include and on each occasion he added that. Then Ma introduced himself (line 19) and the four 
other delegates in turn did likewise. 
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Extract 4: Introductions in the welcome meeting 
1. Chair:  could could I now ask if if the members 。could each introduce themselves  
2.  so that we can learn 。 um 。who they are and what their interests are. 
3.  [Int interprets into Chinese] 
4.  [HoD turns to the other delegates] 
5. HoD:  中 we each introduce ourselves 中 
6. Shen:  中 you just do it on our behalf中 
7. HoD:  中 first of all to <name of host company>=中 
8.   [HoD looks down in front of him. Chair looks at him, smiling] 
9. Int:  =中 no no. he said you introduce yourself 。I am from <name of company>中 
10.  [Chair still looks at HoD] 
11. HoD:  中 I'm Sun from <name of company> 中 
12.  [Int interprets into English; all visitors start looking at colleagues and Chair] 
13. Chen:  中 say what you do 中 
14. HoD:  中 I’m involved in design中 
15.   [Chair nods at HoD] 
16. Xu:  中 give your full name 。full name 。 full name 。say you’re a design engineer中 
17. HoD:  中 design engineer中 
18.  [Int interprets into English] 
19. Ma:  中 I am director of the <name of product> Department, of <name> Company中 
20.  [Int interprets into English] 
21.   [Chair nods at Ma]. 
22.  [4 more people introduce themselves as Ma did] 
 
For the British chair, this was a confusing few moments. He thought he had requested something very 
straight forward (that each person introduce himself) but this led to a noticeable amount of discussion 
among the Chinese which he could not understand. In the follow-up interview/playback session, he 
commented on this when he saw the video recording of this part of the meeting (Extract 5). The 
researcher then explained that the HoD was trying to give a return speech and that the interpreter 
interrupted him, telling the HoD they should introduce themselves. The Chair then attributed 
responsibility for the problem to the interpreter. 
  
Extract 5: British chair interview/playback comment 
Chair: that’s where you wonder well what did the translator say. you know, because they, they 
went on and there was clearly some discussion about, amongst the group, as to who who 
is the most important, who should start, who shouldn’t, and, 。。。。。 you know it is 
chaos […] 
Res:  [Explains that the HoD was trying to give a return speech but that the interpreter 
interrupted and told them to introduce themselves]  
Chair:  and that’s interesting, so it goes back to the point of our concern about interpretation, 
because if the interpreter said to me that they are just making a return speech, then it 
would have been fine. 
Res:  so you didn’t expect the return speech from them, did you? 
Chair:  no, I didn’t, well sometimes you do sometimes, like the times when we do it more formally 
 
13 
 
As far as the British chair was concerned, the Interpreter’s interruption gave rise to some confusion 
and this (along with the general quality of the Interpreter’s interpreting) led to a negative evaluation 
of the Interpreter’s competence. However, he was completely unaware of any other evaluative 
problems it might have led to. These are revealed in the interview/playback with the Chinese 
delegation.  
Like the British chair, the visitors were dissatisfied with the performance of the Interpreter, but the 
HoD was particularly offended that he had not been given the opportunity for a return speech. He 
commented that it was normal to do so which others agreed with (see Extract 6, lines 1-7) and this 
led to a discussion among the delegates as to who was responsible for this omission (the Interpreter 
or the British chair) and therefore how they should be evaluated (Extract 6, lines 12-23). 
Extract 6: Chinese delegation interview/playback comments 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16  
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
HoD: 
Xu: 
HoD: 
 
Ma: 
Lin: 
Xu: 
Ma: 
 
 
 
HoD: 
Ma: 
HoD: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ma: 
中 according to our home customs //and protocol, speech is delivered \   
 中/to follow customs and protocol\\中 
on the basis of reciprocity. he has made his speech and I am expected to say 
something中 
中 at moments like this the interpreter should not have interrupted中 
中 that’s right中 
中 from the Chinese point of view, it’s normal to say a few words中 
中 in fact let me say something unpleasant, <name of interpreter> was just a 
中 translator,  中 nothing more on this occasion. ...  he shouldn’t take part 中 
[several turns omitted where they continue to comment negatively on the 
interpreter and wonder why he interrupted the HoD] 
中 maybe they didn't want me to speak. 中 
中it is true that they didn't ask you to speak. 中 
中I was speaking and if they didn't want me to he wasn't wrong. you and I 
are not familiar with things here, that is, perhaps the British look down upon 
us Chinese. from this point of view, that’s what was implied. in fact I was 
reluctant to speak, and I had nothing really to say. but I had to, to say a few 
words. it was like that, right? but you didn’t let me speak, you had finished 
your speech, and you each introduced yourselves, doesn’t that clearly imply 
this? that you look down upon Chinese people. 中 
中 no no. in this this whole thing I felt <name of interpreter> I still remember 
it very well. I felt <name of interpreter> played a very important role at this 
moment. 中 
 
 
All the delegates agreed that the HoD should have had the opportunity to give a return speech, so 
the evaluation of the British hosts rested on the delegates’ interpretations of the Interpreter’s 
behaviour. Since he was recruited by the British company, the HoD thought perhaps the Interpreter 
knew the British did not want him to give a return speech because they look down on Chinese 
people and that therefore the Interpreter was acting appropriately for his role (lines 12, 14-16). He 
concluded that the British looked down on Chinese people. On the other hand, another delegate, 
Ma, disputed this, arguing that the Interpreter’s behaviour was critical here (lines 21-23).  After this, 
the discussion turned to the issue of self-introductions. Delegates commented that in China they 
would not give their names in such circumstances and that this resulted in further confusion. They 
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ended their review of this part of the meeting by reiterating that the HoD should have been allowed 
to give a return speech.  
In this section of the meeting, therefore, the British and Chinese participants held different norms 
(and associated expectations) with regard to protocols for welcomes and introductions in business 
meetings. The British assumed that the chair would give an initial welcome and that each person on 
the British side would then introduce themselves, giving their name, role and responsibility. The 
chair also assumed that the Chinese delegates would introduce themselves individually. He did not 
anticipate that the Chinese HoD would be expecting to give a return speech, nor that they would be 
expecting the HoD to handle all the introductions on behalf of each delegate.  
For the Chinese, however, the British chair’s behaviour breached their norms and associated 
expectations, as did the Interpreter’s behaviour, and this resulted in negative evaluations of them 
both.  They criticised the Interpreter for overstepping the responsibilities of his role, saying that he 
should not have stepped in, but should simply have interpreted what each party said. The warrant 
underpinning this evaluation seems to relate directly to a belief that people should keep to their role 
responsibilities; it seems to link with the MMM foundation of moderation. The warrant underlying 
the HoD’s evaluation of the British chair is very clear. He linked it explicitly with 
authority/subversion, maintaining not simply that the British chair was condescending towards 
Chinese people, but generalising it to all British people and treating it as evidence that British people 
look down on Chinese people. The British staff were completely unaware of this. 
Shortly after Extract 4 (i.e. after the delegation had introduced themselves), all the British except the 
chair left the meeting and the chair gave a presentation to the visitors about the company. In the 
follow-up meeting, the delegates had some further critical comments to make about subsequent 
aspects of the meeting, but for reasons of space these are not included here.   
5. Discussion 
We now re-visit the research questions in the light of the findings. 
RQ1: What elements are associated with the evaluation process? 
The data show clearly that both the British and Chinese participants evaluated two elements: the 
behaviour of the other party, and the people themselves. In terms of the evaluation flow sequence, 
Hosting Incident 2 (the return speech) offers the greatest amount of insight. The Chinese first 
evaluated the unexpected event – that the HoD was not given the opportunity to give a return 
speech. This was judged to be a norm violation that breached the seriousness threshold. This then 
triggered a second evaluation – that of the agent (i.e. the British chair). This is in line with the flow 
shown in Figure 1. 
In terms of evaluation of the agent, the HoD and another delegate, Ma, held different views as to 
the causality. Ma felt the Chair was not responsible, that it was the Interpreter who caused the 
problem. On the other hand, the HoD regarded the Chair as responsible. In terms of Figure 1, Ma 
would exit the flow at ‘Agent causality’ with regard to the HoD but would continue it with regard to 
the Interpreter. The Interpreter deliberately interrupted the HoD and so this takes us to ‘explore 
reasons’. The most likely explanation is that he thought it was his job as an interpreter to convey 
clearly the message of the other person and that this was his reason for interrupting. However, 
although this seems to be Ma’s interpretation, for the HoD this was not the case. He thought the 
British Chair might have told the interpreter not to allow a return speech (Extract 6, lines 12 and 14), 
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because the British look down on the Chinese. Here he generalised from one individual to the whole 
British nation to attribute agent causality and intentionality for the breach of norms.  
This unpacking of the flow of evaluation processes indicates that Figure 1 needs to be slightly 
modified so that ‘explore reasons’ is activated earlier in the flow. This has been incorporated into a 
revised figure (see Figure 2 below). 
RQ2: What warrants underpin people’s evaluations? 
In terms of the warrants underpinning people’s evaluations, the moral foundations identified in 
Haidt’s MFT (Graham et al., 2018; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) and Janoff-Bulman 
and Carnes’ (2018) MMM were both found to be relevant (see Tables 1 and 2). The Chinese 
participants were explicitly concerned about issues of hierarchy, equality/inequality, and from that 
perspective MFT is more useful in that it explicitly identifies authority/subversion as a moral 
foundation. In contrast, MMM’s foundation of ‘social order’ is too broad and vague to capture the 
specific issues.  Both British and Chinese participants were concerned about consideration and care 
and this seems to be captured slightly better in MFT’s foundation of care/harm than MMM’s 
specification of ‘not harming’ on the one hand and helping/fairness on the other. 
On the other hand, there is nothing in MFT to capture the concerns of both sets of participants 
about professionalism2. All were concerned about the quality of the Interpreter’s performance and 
the British negatively evaluated the Chinese delegates for just wanting to go shopping and for not 
showing any interest in the product that they were supposed to be inspecting. The warrant 
underpinning these negative evaluations relates to MMM’s intrapersonal foundations. The Chinese 
felt the Interpreter overstepped the boundaries of the role of an interpreter (Extract 6, lines 8-9) and 
this could be seen as a breach of moderation. The British staff negatively evaluated the Chinese 
visitors for wanting to spend so much time shopping (while on a business trip) and that too can be 
related to a breach of moderation. The British staff also negatively evaluated the Chinese delegates 
for their lack of interest in learning about the product that their company had bought. The warrant 
underpinning this negative evaluation could be related to industriousness.  
The two moral foundations frameworks, MFT and MMM, thus have strengths and weaknesses. In 
certain respects, MFT provides valuable greater detail than MMM. On the other hand, MFT does not 
include any intrapersonal foundations, which in fact are useful. Superficially it might seem that only 
interpersonal and group foundations are relevant to (im)politeness evaluations. However, Janoff-
Bulman and Carnes (2018, p. 226) explain that “industriousness, which benefits the self, also has 
implications for the group; hard work, persistence, and conscientiousness ultimately serve to 
advance the community’s knowledge, skills and resources.” They also report that in two separate 
studies in which open-ended responses about morality were coded, a work ethic category needed to 
be added. The findings from the data from this delegation visit offers further support for the need 
for this category. 
In terms of the relation between norms and the moral order, the findings support the position that 
the two need to be distinguished. Norms are associated with behavioural regularities or patternings 
and are either descriptive or prescriptive/proscriptive (Cialdini, 2012). However, there are warrants 
that underpin or provide the justification for people’s evaluations of any breaches of the norms, and 
Haidt’s MFT (Graham et al., 2018; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) and Janoff-Bulman 
and Carnes’ (2018) MMM both offer valuable insights. On the other hand, neither framework is 
comprehensive enough on its own and more research is needed gain a fuller picture. This is in line 
with Haugh and Chang’s (2018) comment that moral foundations are not sufficiently granular to 
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account for participants’ rationales. In terms of the potential distinction between social norms and 
moral norms, the data do not offer any definitive new insights. However, none of the breaches seem 
strongly morally wrong but also are not simple breaches of conventions, which seems to offer 
tentative support to the continuum standpoint (Huebner et al., 2010). 
RQ3: How do cultural factors affect people’s evaluations? 
Both parties had quite explicit ingroup/outgroup or ‘them and us’ orientations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2011). This was particularly obvious in the HoD’s evaluation of the British Chair’s failure to invite him 
to give a return speech. He interpreted the omission in British versus Chinese terms, saying that the 
chair may have acted like this because of his (along with other British people’s) condescending 
attitude towards Chinese people. 
While he presumably held those kinds of attitudes prior to the meeting, it was two specific breaches 
of norms for hosting business people that brought them to the surface during the visit. According to 
the follow-up interview/playback data, all the Chinese delegates agreed (a) on the ‘proper’ seating 
arrangements for a visit of this kind (i.e. the two parties should sit opposite each other on the long 
sides of a rectangular table, with the more senior persons in the middle), and (b) that each party 
should have the opportunity to give a speech. This therefore raises the following question: were 
these interpretations representative of Chinese interpretations more generally or were they 
idiosyncratic to this group or context? As discussed above, sharedness, which is central to many 
conceptualisations of culture, is a problematic concept because of the variability among cultural 
group members. In fact, norms typically apply to specific roles and contexts and thus are not usually 
widely generalisable. Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, and Southwood (2013, p. 158), for example, 
comment that “Many norms are intensely role-specific.”     
Interestingly, in terms of the return speech, there is some evidence from other data that the 
expectation did not apply only to this particular group. Another Chinese delegation that visited the 
same British engineering company faced the same issue; on that occasion, the HoD simply grasped 
the opportunity near the end of the meeting to give his return speech. Likewise, Wang and Spencer-
Oatey (2015) report such an incident during a visit to the USA of a group of Chinese government 
officials.  
At the morning meeting, the HoD was not asked to give a return speech. However, when 
the American officials announced that the floor was open for questions, the HoD took the 
first turn to deliver a five-minute-long speech. The Americans’ facial expressions betrayed 
their surprise and confusion at certain points, but they, too, did not comment on it. In the 
evening, the Chinese officials commended the HoD’s move as a fight for face.  
D6:  But the HoD did a very good job by making up for our return speech after the floor 
was open. This implied our firm position.   
D14:  Absolutely! The HoD’s move indicated our consciousness of this right and fought 
for our face. This was especially meaningful.     
Wang and Spencer-Oatey (2015, p. 59)           
This suggests that the norm of return speeches is shared among Chinese business people or 
government officials who are taking part in formal business/negotiation/exchange meetings. 
However, there can be another source of variability.  People may evaluate the seriousness of any 
breach in different ways; for example, the other delegation that visited the same engineering 
company were much less upset about the omission. Various context-specific reasons may help 
account for this, including the exact roles of the people concerned (in the other meeting most 
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members were technical engineers; in this meeting they were more senior sales managers; see  
Spencer-Oatey & Xing, 2003, p. 42). 
In terms of the seating arrangements, there is also a certain amount of broader evidence for norms 
on this. Wang (2013) found that the Chinese government officials visiting the USA were very 
conscious of the physical setting of their meetings, and Spencer-Oatey (personal experience) found 
the same when managing exchange meetings for the eChina-UK programme. 
All this suggests that there may be shared norms, but these may be very context specific (e.g. in 
terms of both participants and type of communicative event) and people may react to breaches of 
those norms in different ways. However, there is another key element that seems to be rarely 
discussed: the meaning that people attribute to the performance or breach of the norm. Brennan et 
al. (2013, p. 156) comment as follows: 
Doing certain things in a context where norms exist mean certain things that would not and 
could not have been meant had the norms not existed. (emphasis in the original) 
The implication of this is that the establishment of common ground for shared interpretation of 
meaning can only occur where both parties have shared norms or else are aware of each other’s 
respective norms. In the data reported here, the Chinese and British participants were not aware of 
each other’s norms and thus the behaviour ‘meant’ different things to the two parties. This suggests 
that more conceptualisation work is needed on the ‘meaning’ of norms – not just whether or not 
people conform to a norm or disapprove of a breach, but what that normative behaviour means or 
signifies and hence what a breach ‘means’.  
We propose, therefore, that the flow diagram of the evaluation process shown in Figure 1 be 
modified to incorporate the new insights from this study: (a) that consideration of reasons for agent 
behaviour occurs earlier in the sequence as it seems to inform thinking about agent causality and 
agent intentionality, and (b) that the role of interpretation of the meaning of normative behaviour 
influences people’s threshold judgements and also provide a link with the underlying moral 
foundations. Perhaps it is the combination of people’s interpretations of the meaning of normative 
behaviour as well as their underpinning moral foundations that provide the warrants for people’s 
evaluative judgements. The revised conceptualisation is shown in Figure 2. 
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Evaluation warrant
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Unexpected event
Norm violation?
Stop
Seriousness of 
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No 
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culpability of 
agent
Preventive
 capacity
High/low
Unsure
Moral 
foundations
For evaluation:
Agent 
Interpretation of 
meaning of norm 
violation
 
Fig.2: Flow diagram of the evaluation process in intercultural interaction 
6. Concluding comments 
In this paper we have argued that the evaluation process entails a number of elements which need 
to be conceptually separated out. These include: behaviour, agent, norms, and moral foundations. 
There are also various reflective processes associated with these key elements that also contribute 
to the evaluation and we have tentatively suggested a flow diagram to try to capture these. We 
acknowledge that this is no doubt a simplification of reality, but we hope that it will stimulate 
further thinking and conceptualisation. 
We argue that in intercultural interaction, if one participant is unaware of an injunctive norm held by 
another participant, the ‘meaning’ of the performance or of the breach of that norm will not be the 
same for the two participants. If the performance or the breach is of high importance (perhaps for 
ideological reasons) for one participant, and the other is unaware of this, the probability of 
mismatches in their evaluations is likely to increase. We suggest therefore that future research in 
particular examines the ‘meaning’ of norms and how that relates both to the evaluation process and 
to the notion of moral foundations. 
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Abbreviations and Transcription conventions 
HoD Head of delegation 
Int Interpreter 
Res Researcher 
All names are pseudonyms 
Original Chinese of translated sections are available in Xing (2002) 
[Chair looks at HoD] Explanatory comment 
<name> Anonymisation of personal or company name 
//and protocol\ Simultaneous speech - first speaker's utterance 
/to follow customs\\ Simultaneous speech - second speaker's utterance 
=  Latching, i.e., no discernible pause between utterances 
中 according to 中 English translation of original Chinese 
… Omitted text/comments 
。 Pause of up to one second 
。。。。。  Pause of five seconds or more noted in brackets 
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